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“PREP”ARING FOR A CHALLENGE TO GOVERNMENTOWNED PATENTS
Caleb A. Holland +

The word “patent” traces its origin to the Latin word “patere”—to be open. 1
Indeed, the underlying impact of a patent system is that it promulgates the open
exchange of information to disseminate new ideas into the public sphere. 2 The
concept of a government-owned patent, however, can run contrary to this ideal.
While the number of government-owned patents has waned in recent years, the
United States Government was granted over 1,000 utility patents in 2019 alone. 3
Interestingly, despite owning such a prodigious patent estate, it surprisingly does
not often sue for patent infringement. 4 To understand why, it is necessary to
understand the nature of an American patent — from its Constitutional origins,
to judicial interpretations, and finally to modern statutory refinements. In
addition to understanding patents, one needs to have an appreciation of the
unique status the United States government holds as an entity that both issues
and owns patents. Public policy norms and historical traditions have constrained
much of what the government has chosen to do with its patents, but a recent
confrontation between the Department of Health and Human Services and
pharmaceutical company Gilead Sciences, Inc. is challenging those norms and
traditions. 5 In refusing to accept a license for usage of the CDC-owned patent

+
Caleb Holland is a J.D. graduate of The Catholic University of America Columbus School of
Law with a background in health science, completing his B.S. in Biology and graduate certificate
in Global Health at Old Dominion University. The author would like to thank Luis E. Zambrano
Ramos for his advice and guidance, and the Catholic University Law Review for its invaluable
support in editing this Comment.
1. 1 JOHN GLADSTONE MILLS III ET AL., PAT. L. FUNDAMENTALS § 1:1 (2d ed. 2020).
2. Effective Use of Government-Owned Rights to Inventions: Publication Versus Patenting,
55 GEO. L. J. 1083, 1084 (1967) [hereinafter Publication Versus Patenting] (“The purpose of the
patent laws is primarily to channel significant inventions swiftly into the mainstream of the
economy.”).
3. See Captain Steven R. Fuscher, USAF, How the Government Obtains Patent Rights
Under the ASPR and FPR Patent Rights Clauses – Part I: When Is the Government Entitled to
Patent Rights?, 20 A.F.L. REV. 209, 209 (1978) (explaining that between 1970 and 1975 alone, the
U.S. Government received 52,996 invention disclosures from approximately $100 billion dollars
in research and development); see also U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, Patenting by
Organizations (Utility Patents) 2019, Part A1- Table A1-1b, Breakout by Ownership Category
(2019). https://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/topo_19.htm#PartA1_1b
4. See Thomas Lizzi, From Benevolent Administration to Government Employee Inventions,
Human Genomes, and Exclusive Licensing: Is Governmental Ownership of Patents
Constitutional?, 34 DUQ. L. REV. 299, 300–01 (1996).
5. Complaint at 3, United States v. Gilead Scis., Inc., No. 1:19-cv-02103-UNA (D. Del. filed
Nov. 6, 2019).
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for PrEP, Gilead could be testing the limits of what the government is willing to
do with its patents.
This Comment will examine the nature of government-owned patents and
attempt to answer the question why the government has heretofore been reticent
to exercise its patent rights against infringers. Finally, this Comment will look
specifically at the case of United States v. Gilead Sciences, Inc. and provide
observations as to potential implications that could result from the suit, and
ultimately will probe whether or not the federal government can or should take
action when its patent rights are infringed.
I. BACKGROUND AND PRIOR LAW
A. The Origins of Patents in the United States
One of the earliest known acquisitions of patent rights by the United States
federal government dates back to 1812, with an Act of Congress that
appropriated sixty thousand dollars for the purchase of technology related to the
lighting of lighthouses. 6 Since that time the government has acquired thousands
of patents through similar modes of acquisition, as well as by acquiring rights
and licenses through the theory of “shop right” 7 and by directly filing for patents
in its name on behalf of its employees. 8 But what does the government do with
its patent estate? What can the government do with its patents? To understand
these questions, one must examine the nature of a patent right, as well as the
different scenarios that could implicate the government’s patents.
The ability to patent is so important to our society that its roots trace back to
the Constitution. 9 Congress was given the enumerated power to “promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors
and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and
Discoveries[.]” 10 This clause is commonly known as the “Intellectual Property
Clause.” 11 Patents and copyrights as we know them in the United States are
Congress’ way of exercising this Constitutional prerogative. 12 It is helpful to
understand that a patent is, at bottom, a contract between the patent-holder and

6. Act of March 2, 1812, ch. 34, 2 Stat. 691.
7. JOHN GLADSTONE MILLS III ET AL., PAT. L. BASICS § 12:10 (Nov. 2020) (explaining that
“[t]he Supreme Court developed the concept of shop right as a form of equitable compensation for
situations where the employer has financed an employee’s invention by providing wages, materials,
tools, and a work place.”).
8. See Lizzi, supra note 4, at 305–06.
9. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
10. Id.
11. David L. Lange, The Intellectual Property Clause in Contemporary Trademark Law: An
Appreciation of Two Recent Essays and Some Thoughts About Why We Ought to Care, 59 SPG L.
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 213, 213 (1996); see also Allen v. Cooper, 140 S. Ct. 994, 1001 (2020).
12. Publication Versus Patenting, supra note 2, at 1084.
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the government. 13 In exchange for the rights attendant to owning a patent, the
inventor must disclose information to the public. 14 Therefore, while securing to
inventors the ability to profit from their achievements is certainly a collateral
effect of patents—and additionally incentivizes the patenting of new inventions
and discoveries—it is arguably not the primary purpose of a patent. 15
Ultimately, society is the key benefactor of patents; new information begets new
discovery and, therefore, society progresses.
Patents have been described as limited monopolies, 16 but this definition does
not take into account the appropriate nuance of patents. While patents are
traditionally viewed as property, they do not fall neatly within the paradigm of
either real or personal property. 17 The key to understanding this is to recognize
that the essential element of a patent is the property right of exclusion. 18 To
illustrate, assume that one invents, uses, and markets a new product. That
inventor did not need a patent to grant them the ability to invent, use, or market
that product. In fact, one cannot even obtain a patent until the product has itself
been sufficiently realized to qualify for the patent. 19 Instead, obtaining a patent
provides the patent-holder with the critical right to prevent (i.e., exclude) others
from making and marketing the same invention. 20 Therefore, owning a patent
does not actually grant the patent-holder the “positive” rights to create and use,
but rather the “negative” right to exclude others from making the same
invention. 21 This exclusionary right seems, on some level, to be at odds with
“promot[ing] the [p]rogress of [s]cience and useful [a]rts.” 22 However, this is
reconciled when viewed in light of the way patents function overall to bring forth
new information into the public consciousness.
Philosophical distinctions notwithstanding, patents have common elements
that have been outlined by statute. 23 While the intricacies of patent law are
numerous and generally beyond the scope of this article, it is still useful to have
a basic understanding of these fundamental elements. Inventions are patenteligible if they fall into at least one of four categories: “processes or methods;

13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. See Lizzi, supra note 4, at 302 (citing PETER D. ROSENBURG, PAT. L. BASICS §1.03
(1993)).
17. Sean M. O’Connor, Taking, Tort, or Crown Right?: The Confused Early History of
Government Patent Policy, 12 JOHN MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 145, 146 (2012).
18. Id. at 147.
19. Lizzi, supra note 4, at 303–04 (providing the requirements of patentability).
20. Publication Versus Patenting, supra note 2, at 1084–85 (“The most active use of a patent
occurs through the exercise of . . . exclud[ing] others from making, using, or selling the invention.”).
21. O’Connor, supra note 17, at 147.
22. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8.
23. 35 U.S.C. § 101.
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[]machines or apparatuses; []manufactures; and []compositions of matter.” 24
Within these categories, patent applications must satisfy the statutory conditions
of utility, novelty, and non-obviousness of the subject matter. 25 The Supreme
Court has carved out three exceptions to patentability: laws of nature; physical
phenomena; and abstract ideas. 26 The patents examined later in this Comment
are presumed valid for the sake of argument.
B. Patents vs. Copyrights
Notably lacking in the above-mentioned history and purpose of patents is the
ability, right, or authority of the government to grant patents to itself or to
otherwise acquire patent rights. In fact, a significant number of commenters
have suggested that there is no constitutional basis for the government to own
patents at all. 27 This quirk of the law is even more puzzling considering that
government ownership of the other part of the intellectual property clause –
copyrights – has been thoroughly examined and addressed by United States

24. Elizabeth D. Lauzon, Annotation, Patentability Under 35 U.S.C.A. § 101 Which Excludes
Laws of Nature, Physical Phenomena, and Abstract Ideas, 5 A.L.R. Fed. 3d. Art. 4 § 2 (2015)
(ALR is updated weekly).
25. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 101–103. § 103 states:
A patent for a claimed invention may not be obtained, notwithstanding that the claimed
invention is not identically disclosed as set forth in section 102, if the differences between
the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole
would have been obvious before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to a
person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains.
Patentability shall not be negated by the manner in which the invention was made.
35 U.S.C. §103. See generally, U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., General Information Concerning
Patents, (Oct. 2015), https://www.uspto.gov/patents-getting-started/general-informationconcerning-patents.
26. Because “[l]aws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas are ‘the basic tools of
scientific and technological work[,]’” the Supreme Court has expressed concern that monopolizing
these tools by granting patent rights may impede innovation rather than promote it. Alice Corp.
Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 216 (2014). See Mayo Collaborative Servs. v.
Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 71(2012). However, the Court has also emphasized that an
invention is not considered to be ineligible for patenting simply because it involves an abstract
concept. Alice Corp., 573 U.S. at 217 (citing Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 187 (1981)); see
also Thales Visionix, Inc. v. United States, 850 F.3d 1343, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“That a
mathematical equation is required to complete the claimed method and system does not doom the
claims to abstraction.”). Accordingly, the Court has said that an application of an abstract idea, law
of nature, or natural phenomenon may be eligible for patent protection. Alice Corp., 573 U.S. at
217 (citing Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972)). U. S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., 2106
Patent Subject Matter Eligibility [R-10.2019], https://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/mpep/
s2106.html.
27. See Publication Versus Patenting, supra note 2, at 1088; Frank J. Willie, Government
Ownership of Patents, 12 FORDHAM L. REV. 105, 111 (1943); see generally Lizzi, supra note 4, at
299.
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law. 28 As a matter of public policy, the government has, originally through
judicial decision and eventually through statutory enactment, determined that
there must be some restriction on ownership of copyrights in government
publications. 29 In sum, the courts found that because “such material as the laws
and governmental rules and decisions must be freely available to the public and
made known as widely as possible . . . there must be no restriction on the
reproduction and dissemination of such documents.” 30 In regard to state
government documents, the courts determined that while statutes and decisions
were not eligible for copyright, the added material such as “headnotes, syllabi,
annotations, indexes, etc.” was deemed eligible. 31 The courts did not have
occasion to determine whether copyright eligibility also applied to the federal
government. 32 This idea of a distinction between government related documents
that were and were not copyrightable has been referred to as the “public policy
rule” 33 which essentially means that government publications were not eligible
for copyright. 34 Congress first codified this position with the Printing Act of
1895. 35 Today, the prohibition still exists as a provision of the Copyright Act of
1976, 36 codified in Title 17 of the United States Code. 37 The end result of this
policy is that, with few exceptions, 38 nearly anyone may copy, disseminate, or
otherwise use documents or data produced by federal agencies, with no need for
a license, notice, or royalties. 39
What is important to note about the government’s position on copyrights is
that the branches of government recognized early in our nation’s history that
public policy demanded limitations on the government’s use of the intellectual
property clause of the Constitution. Government-owned patents, on the other
28. See generally STAFF OF S. COMM. ON PAT., TRADEMARKS, AND COPYRIGHTS, 86TH
CONG., COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION: STUDIES PREPARED FOR THE SUBCOMM. ON PATENTS,
TRADEMARKS, COPYRIGHT IN GOVERNMENT PUBLICATIONS 27 (Comm. Print 1961).
29. Id. at 27. See also 17 U.S.C. § 105(a) (“Copyright protection under this title is not
available for any work of the United States Government . . . .”)
30. STAFF OF S. COMM. ON PAT., TRADEMARKS, AND COPYRIGHTS, 86TH CONG.,
COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION: STUDIES PREPARED FOR THE SUBCOMM. ON PATENTS,
TRADEMARKS, COPYRIGHT IN GOVERNMENT PUBLICATIONS 27 (Comm. Print 1961).
31. Id. at 28.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 29.
35. Id.
36. Robert M. Gellman, Twin Evils: Government Copyright and Copyright-Like Controls
Over Government Information, 45 SYRACUSE L. REV. 999, 1024–25 (1995).
37. 17 U.S.C. § 105 (“Copyright protection under this title is not available for any work of
the United States Government, but the United States Government is not precluded from receiving
and holding copyrights transferred to it by assignment, bequest, or otherwise.”).
38. For exceptions, see e.g. 15 U.S.C. § 290e; U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, INTRODUCTION TO
THE THIRD EDITION OF THE COMPENDIUM OF U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE PRACTICES 30–31(3d ed.
2017).
39. See Gellman, supra note 36, at 1026.
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hand, did not receive such attention. One possible explanation for this is that,
while not mandated by statute, the traditional policy of the United States has
been to issue an applicant a non-exclusive, royalty-free license to a patent if
requested. 40 It has been speculated that this benign position has resulted in a
lack of challenges to government patent ownership. 41
C. What Does the Government Patent, and How Does it do it?
The United States spends significant amounts of tax-payer dollars on research
and development in various industries and fields of study. The most recently
available data at the time of writing indicates that the United States government
spent over 580 billion dollars on these endeavors in 2018 alone. 42 Some of the
earliest examples of government patent ownership relate to war-related
technology. 43 Indeed, even today the majority of research and development
spending is devoted to national defense, with health, space, general science,
energy, agriculture, and national resources & environment constituting the
remainder. 44 The fruit of this research is often patented in some form or
another. 45 It is not surprising, therefore, that the government is consistently one
of the largest patent holders in the United States. 46
Appreciating the role of research and development in government patents is
critical for the purposes of this Comment because it directly precipitated the two
main theories that exist today regarding government-owned patents. 47 The
debate over the government’s role in patenting government-financed inventions
traces back to the 1800s. 48 However, the significance of this debate certainly
grew in proportion to the substantial increase in government spending on
research and development during and after the Second World War. 49

40. Publication Versus Patenting, supra note 2, at 1091.
41. Lizzi, supra note 4, at 299. It is also worth noting that issues surrounding copyrights are
tangential to free speech issues, which is another possible reason why copyrights have been given
more attention than patents. Further, it is possible that copyrights had to be dealt with because of
the universal need for citizens to be aware of the law. No such universal need exists with patents,
which could also explain why copyrights have been restricted differently than patents.
42. JOHN F. SARGENT, JR., CONG. RSCH. SERV., R44307, U.S. RESEARCH AND
DEVELOPMENT FUNDING AND PERFORMANCE: FACT SHEET (2020).
43. O’Connor, supra note 17, at 154–55 (In 1836, Congress authorized the purchase of two
patents from Captain William H. Bell, both relating to cannon technology. In 1846, Congress
authorized the purchase of a machine called a “manger stopper” for “all ships of war or other vessels
belonging to the United States”).
44. Sargent, supra note 42, at 2.
45. Publication Versus Patenting, supra note 2, at 1083.
46. See supra note 3.
47. Josh Lerner, Patent Policy Innovations: A Clinical Examination, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1841,
1852 (2000).
48. Id.
49. Id.
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D. How the Government Acquires Patent Rights
Patents are statutorily treated as personal property. 50 This includes the right
of assignment and the ability to grant and convey, in whole or in part, any interest
in a patent to the United States government. 51 While the government may utilize
one of these methods to acquire patent rights, perhaps the most common method
of attainment is through inventions developed by its employees. 52 The concept
of “shop right” is a common law doctrine developed by the United States
Supreme Court, which provides that when an employer has provided the
means—i.e., tools, materials, wages, etc.—for developing an invention, that
employer is entitled to some form of equitable compensation. 53 That
“compensation” is usually manifested as a vested right to an “irrevocable,
equitable license to use the invention.” 54 Shop right has been extended to the
federal government. 55 It is important to note that a shop right is not by definition
confined to the employee-employer relationship; the full nature of the
relationship considering all facts and circumstances are taken into account to
determine the existence of a shop right. 56
Aside from shop right, there are other ways under common law that an
employer can come to own or at least rightfully use an employee’s patent. 57 The
baseline assumption is that the rights to an invention belong to the inventor, and
“[a]bsent an agreement to the contrary, an employer does not have rights in an
invention ‘which is the original conception of the employee alone.’” 58 This is
premised on the fact that “original conception” excludes the usage of an
employer’s resources; in other words, if an employer provided the necessary
means to bring an invention to fruition, they facilitated the invention in such a
way as to preclude a finding of “original conception of the employee alone.” 59
In these instances, the employer is entitled to an irrevocable, royalty-free
license. 60 Two other common exceptions exist to the general rule, which says

50. 35 U.S.C. § 261 (“Subject to the provisions of this title, patents shall have the attributes
of personal property.”).
51. Id.
52. See Lizzi, supra note 4, at 305.
53. MILLS III ET AL., supra note 7.
54. Id.
55. Lizzi, supra note 4, at 305 (citing United States v. Dubilier Condensor Corp., 289 U.S.
178 (1933) stating that the federal government has the common law right, i.e. shop right, to an
employee’s inventions).
56. Id. at 304.
57. See Paul Spiel, Express Employee Patent Assignments: Staying True to Intellectual
Property’s Credo of Rewarding Innovation, 99 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 79, 84 (2017).
58. Bd. of Trs. of the Leland Stan. Junior Univ. v. Roche Molecular Sys., Inc., 563 U.S. 776,
777 (2011) (explaining that “[s]ince 1790, patent law has operated on the premise that rights in an
invention belong to the inventor.”).
59. See Spiel, supra note 57, at 84.
60. MILLS III ET AL., supra note 7.
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that inventors own their inventions. 61 These include an express contract, in
which consideration would be paid to the inventor in return for the invention,
and, relatedly, in the circumstance where an employee has been hired to exercise
his “inventive faculties” for a specific project. 62
As noted above, the common law doctrine of shop right extends to the federal
government as an employer. 63 However, a combination of executive orders and
statutory enactments laid the groundwork for the current paradigm of how the
government handles inventions by its employees. 64 Two reports, commissioned
by President Franklin Roosevelt shortly after the start of the Second World War,
articulate the debate. 65 The first report, created by the National Patent Planning
Commission (the “Commission”), recognized that the traditional position of the
government was to issue non-exclusive, royalty-free licenses stemming from
patents held by non-defense agencies. 66 The report noted that some
government-owned patents should be commercialized and made available to the
public; however, the policy of freely granting licenses acted as an impediment
to that commercialization. 67 The Commission believed that, if substantial
capital and investment were required on the part of a private business, that
business would be less likely to incur those expenses if they could not be
guaranteed the commercial advantage of an exclusive license. 68 The
Commission’s recommendation was not to fully endorse granting exclusive
licenses, but to posit that licensing practices should be allowed to vary among
the different government agencies. 69 This selective granting of licenses has far
reaching implications, which will be discussed further in the Comment.
A second report by the Department of Justice argued that exclusive licenses
should be forbidden, except in extraordinary circumstances. 70 The report
pointed out that innovations funded by the public should be for the benefit of the
public. 71 If a license was granted which created a purely private monopoly, the
public could be asked to pay for—or even be denied access to—technology
which was already publicly funded. 72 Three years after the release of the
Department of Justice report, in 1950, President Truman issued Executive Order

61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.

See Spiel, supra note 57, at 84.
Id.
Lizzi, supra note 4, at 305.
Id. at 299.
Lerner, supra note 47, at 1852–53 (citing H.R. Doc. No. 79-22 (1945)).
Id.
Id. at 1853.
H.R. Doc. No. 79-22, at 5–6 (1945).
Id. at 7.
Lerner, supra note 47, at 1853.
Id.
Id.
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10096. 73 The Order established new policy that called for the government to
obtain:
[T]he entire right, title and interest in and to all inventions made by
any Government employee (1) during working hours, or (2) with a
contribution by the Government of facilities, equipment, materials,
funds, or information, or of time or services of other Government
employees on official duty, or (3) which bear a direct relation to or are
made in consequence of the official duties of the inventor. 74
Importantly, under this Order the government reserved the right to grant
licenses “for all governmental purposes.” 75 While statistical analysis of
licensing government patents in the immediate aftermath of this Order is lacking,
commenters have noted that the frequency of awarding exclusive licenses to
contractors and government employees is perhaps higher than would be
expected given the recommendations of the Commission and Department of
Justice reports. 76
Congress has worked to strike a balance between encouraging innovation and
protecting government rights. The Bayh-Doyle Act, passed in 1980, gave small
businesses and nonprofit organizations, including universities, the right to patent
inventions made with federal funds. 77 Section 200 of Title 35 of the United
States Code says, in part, “[i]t is the policy and objective of the Congress to use
the patent system to promote the utilization of inventions arising from federally
supported research or development . . .” and “to ensure that the Government
obtains sufficient rights in federally supported inventions to meet the needs of
the Government and protect the public against nonuse or unreasonable use of
inventions . . . .” 78 Another example of Congress applying statutory conditions
on the patent system can be found in the Invention Secrecy Act. 79 As noted
above, a significant portion of patents are in the realm of national defense.
Unsurprisingly, some of the information and discoveries contained in those
patents could be damaging to national security were it to enter into the wrong
hands. Congress passed the Invention Secrecy Act of 1951 to allow the United
States Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”) the ability to order certain
inventions be kept secret. 80 As patent applications are reviewed upon initial
receipt at the USPTO, the Commissioner of Patents can order that the invention
be kept secret if it is determined that publication or disclosure of the invention
73. Exec. Order No. 10096, 3 C.F.R. 76–78 (1950).
74. Id. at 76.
75. Id.
76. Lerner, supra note 47, at 1853.
77. Bayh-Dole Act, Pub. L. No. 96-517, 94 Stat. 3018 (1980) (codified as 35 U.S.C. §§ 200–
206).
78. Id.
79. Invention Secrecy Act, 35 U.S.C. §§ 181–88.
80. James Maune, Patent Secrecy Orders: Fairness Issues in Application of Invention of
Secrecy Act, 20 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 471, 472 (2012).
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(i.e., granting a patent for the invention) “would be detrimental to national
security.” 81 As of 2010, over 5,000 United States patents were subject to a
secrecy order in some form. 82 In this we see an example of Congress bending
the overall policy goal of the patent system — promoting progress of science
and useful arts — to yield to a different goal of protecting national security.
E. Relationship Between the Federal Government and Patent Infringement
Patent infringement is the equivalent of a violation of one’s right to exclude.
When a private party seeks remedy for patent infringement by another private
party, several options are available. 83 These include money damages, including
royalties and interest, and an injunction. 84 Are these same remedies available
when the government is a party in the infringement action? Is the answer
different depending on if the government is a plaintiff or a defendant?
An infringement of rights is an action in tort, rather than in property. 85
However, as stated above, patent rights do have qualities of real and personal
property. 86 It follows, then, that if the government infringes on a privatelyowned patent, and subsequently renders the only meaningful component of a
patent—the right to exclude—meaningless, this is effectively a taking under the
Fifth Amendment. 87 Still, courts in the United States have ruled that
government infringement of patents is not a “taking” because of 14 U.S.C. §
1498, something commonly referred to as the “Government Use Statute.” 88 This
statute provides that the only remedy patent-holders may seek against the
government will be fair compensation in the Court of Federal Claims. 89 Prior to
this statute, the status of remedies for government infringement was murky:
patent grants were not truly established as property rights until 1870 in the

81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Lizzi, supra note 4, at 304–05.
84. Id.
85. O’Connor, supra note 17, at 146–47.
86. See infra Sec. I.
87. O’Connor, supra note 17, at 151.
88. Id.
89. 28 U.S.C. § 1498(a) (providing that “[w]henever an invention described in and covered
by a patent of the United States is used or manufactured by or for the United States without license
. . . the owner’s remedy shall be by action against the United States in the United States Court of
Federal Claims for the recovery of his reasonable and entire compensation for such use and
manufacture.”).
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Supreme Court case of Seymour v. Osborne, 90 and sovereign immunity
precluded suit against the United States, absent consent from Congress. 91
The “Government Use Statute” tracks closely with the English doctrine of
“Crown Right,” which allows the British Government to practice any patent that
it grants. 92 A key difference, however, is that the Government Use Statute
requires fair compensation, whereas Crown Right does not. 93 For this reason,
the Supreme Court has consistently rejected Crown Right in the United States. 94
An 1878 decision by the United States Court of Claims is enlightening in this
regard, as it pointed out that the United States did not view patents as favors or
privileges that can be granted or withdrawn on the whim of a sovereign, but
rather as rights to be secured with the attendant condition of just compensation
for unjust appropriation. 95 The first case brought against the United States for
patent infringement was the case of Pitcher v. United States in 1863, but that
case was ultimately unsuccessful due to lack of jurisdiction. 96
Today, significant debate persists over the government as an actor in the
patent system. The overall landscape is much clearer today than it was in 1863,
but government patent policy in general is still very much evolving. 97 Key to
this Comment is the fact that there are virtually no cases in which the
government has sued a private actor for infringement of a government-owned
patent, particularly in the pharmaceutical context. 98 One extremely rare
exception can be found in a case brought before the United States International

90. Seymour v. Osborne, 78 U.S. 516, 533 (1870) (stating “inventions secured by letters
patent are property in the holder of the patent, and as such are as much entitled to protection as any
other property, consisting of a franchise, during the term for which the franchise or the exclusive
right is granted.”).
91. See, e.g., Schillinger v. United States, 155 U.S. 163, 166 (1894) (stating “[t]he United
States cannot be sued in their courts without their consent”).
92. O’Connor, supra note 17, at 151.
93. Id.; 28 U.S.C. § 1498(a).
94. O’Connor, supra note 17, at 152.
95. Id. at 164 (quoting McKeever v. United States, 14 Ct. Cl. 396, 421 (1878)).
96. Id. at 156–57 (citing Pitcher v. United States, 1 Ct. Cl. 7 (1863)). In sum, the case was
over a machine utilized by a prison warden to have inmates manufacture brooms. At the time,
patent infringement was treated as a tort, and the United States could not be sued for tortious acts.
Pitcher attempted other arguments based on the Takings Clause and a theory of implied contract,
but the court was unpersuaded. Id.
97. Id. at 204 (explaining that several nuances and unresolved issues still exist in government
patent policy).
98. Christopher Rowland, An HIV Treatment Cost Taxpayers Millions. The Government
Patented it. But a Pharma Giant is Making Billions., WASH. POST (Mar. 26, 2019),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/pharma-giant-profits-from-hiv-treatmentfunded-by-taxpayers-and-patented-by-the-government/2019/03/26/cee5afb4-40fc-11e9-9361301ffb5bd5e6_story.html (explaining that the current standoff between the CDC and Gilead is
“extraordinary” and that intellectual-property disputes between the government and private
pharmaceutical companies are rare).
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Trade Commission (“ITC”) in 1984. 99 There, the ITC, on its own motion,
instituted an investigation to determine if certain Swedish and American
companies had violated Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930 by importing
products that infringed on patents owned by the Department of Agriculture. 100
A split Commission recommended that the investigation be terminated on a
technicality, and thus the case was never decided. 101 However, even if this case
had been decided on the merits and found in favor of the government, the
primary remedy available to the ITC is to direct Customs to stop any products
from coming into the country. 102 Whether or not this would have resulted in
significant implications to the patent system is unclear.
F. Constitutional Infirmity of Government Owned Patents
To fully understand the footing of the government when it comes to what it
can and cannot do with its patents, it is helpful to understand the constitutional
arguments against government ownership of patents in the first place. As stated
above, patents are contracts with the government. 103 For the “consideration” of
public disclosure of an invention, the government grants the patent-owner the
right to exclude others from making that invention for a limited time. 104

99. Certain Apparatus for Flow Injection Analysis & Components Thereof, Inv. No. 337-TA151, USITC Pub. (Nov. 1984) (Final).
100. Id. at *1, *4. The ITC is one of the few places where patent challenges can be heard.
About Unfair Import Investigations, USITC, https://www.usitc.gov/intellectual_property/about_
section_337.htm (last visited January 11, 2021). According to the ITC website:
Unfair import (a.k.a Section 337) investigations conducted by the U.S. International
Trade Commission most often involve claims regarding intellectual property rights,
including allegations of patent infringement and trademark infringement by imported
goods. Both utility and design patents, as well as registered and common law trademarks,
may be asserted in these investigations. Other forms of unfair competition involving
imported products, such as infringement of registered copyrights, mask works or boat
hull designs, misappropriation of trade secrets or trade dress, passing off, and false
advertising, may also be asserted.
Id. This provision essentially states that importation of goods into the United States using unfair
trade practices are unlawful. 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a).
101. Certain Apparatus for Flow Injection Analysis & Components Thereof, Inv. No. 337-TA151, USITC Pub. at *4 (Nov. 1984) (Final) (finding that the investigation had to be vacated because
the investigation was based on the original claims and the claims of the reexamined patent did not
match the claims in the original patent).
102. About Unfair Import Investigations, supra note 100. The key here is to note that the ITC
has limited enforcement capabilities: “The primary remedy available in Section 337 investigations
is an exclusion order that directs Customs to stop infringing imports from entering the United
States. In addition, the Commission may issue cease and desist orders against named importers
and other persons engaged in unfair acts that violate Section 337. Expedited relief in the form of
temporary exclusion orders and temporary cease and desist orders may also be available in certain
exceptional circumstances.”
103. See Publication Versus Patenting, supra note 2, at 1084.
104. Lizzi, supra note 4, at 302–03.
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Therefore, to best serve the public policy goal behind granting patents, it follows
that the disclosure be made available to the public as soon as possible. 105
If the government becomes the party to which that right is granted, that
relationship reduces to one party: the government has now made a contract with
itself. 106 This implicates a myriad of issues of contract law, including the
sovereign merger doctrine, which essentially states that if a right issued by a
sovereign returns to the sovereign it is extinguished. 107 In other words, “the
patent becomes a nullity by the very incidence of governmental ownership.” 108
Even if we assume that the patents are legally valid, credible arguments can
be made that the government having the power to exclude (i.e., the essential right
bestowed upon a patent holder) does not serve the public policy interest of the
patent system envisioned by the Framers. 109 First, the purpose behind granting
a right to exclude is to reward and incentivize inventors to invent new things. 110
The government already has a Constitutional mandate to spend money for the
public good, so this incentive is largely irrelevant to the government as a patent
holder. 111 Second, the sheer size and resources of the government apparatus
may have the effect of stifling innovation from private companies who do not
wish to compete with the government in acquiring or utilizing a contested
patent. 112 Finally, the government exercising ownership of patents can have the
effect of restricting or removing information from the public domain, limiting
free access to information that was paid for with public funds. 113

105. Willie, supra note 27, at 106. (“Public policy would seem compellingly to require that an
invention, as soon as it is made and disclosed, should be available to the public.”). Id.
106. Lizzi, supra note 4, at 317–18 (explaining five reasons based on contract law principles
why government-owned patents are unconstitutional: (1) there must be two parties to a contract;
(2) “contract merger doctrine,” which states that if the “promise returns to the hands of the promisor
. . . the contract is extinguished”; (3) “the federal government lacks the capacity to” make a valid
patent contract “of its own issue”; (4) unenforceability of illegal contracts, i.e., that the Intellectual
Property Clause disallows government patent ownership and thus any such patent would be a
contract for an illegal purpose; (5) sovereign grant merger doctrine, i.e. the patent “is void because
the patent rights are extinguished upon their return to the hands of the sovereign which issued them
and cannot constitute the valuable consideration necessary to sustain a valid contract.”).
107. Id. at 316 (The idea of sovereign merger was spoken about by a former Commissioner of
Patents as early as 1928 and was traced back to Thomas Paine).
108. Lizzi, supra note 4, at 316.
109. Id. at 312 (explaining that government ownership of patents inhibits the “progress of the
useful arts” in several significant ways); see also 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (“Except as otherwise provided
in this title, whoever without authority makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells any patented invention,
within the United States or imports into the United States any patented invention during the term
of the patent therefor, infringes the patent.”).
110. Lizzi, supra note 4, at 312.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 312–13.
113. Id. at 313–14.
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G. Case Study: PrEP, Truvada, Gilead, and DHHS.
Amid the recent furor over high prescription drug prices in the United States,
one drug in particular has been highlighted by advocacy groups pushing for
reform. 114 Truvada is a medication manufactured by pharmaceutical company
Gilead Sciences, Inc. 115 Truvada is the brand name for a single pill that contains
two medications: 300 mg of TDF (tenofovir disoproxil fumarate) and 200 mg of
FTC (emtricitabine). 116 TDF and FTC are drugs used to treat persons infected
with HIV to prevent the development of AIDS (acquired immunodeficiency
syndrome). 117 Truvada was approved by the FDA in 2004 for HIV treatment,
but recently has been used not only to treat persons with HIV, but also as a
prophylactic drug that can prevent new HIV infections. 118 This concept has
been called pre-exposure prophylaxis, or “PrEP”. 119 The need for such a drug
cannot be understated. Globally, almost 38 million people are living with HIV
with 1.7 million individuals newly infected in 2018 alone. 120 In the United
States, roughly 1.2 million people live with HIV and approximately 14 percent
(one in seven) of those do not know that they are infected. 121 Since the
beginnings of the epidemic in the early 1980s, over 700,000 people have died
from AIDS in the United States. 122 The first drug approved by the FDA for
treating AIDS came in 1987, with a drug known as azidothymidine (AZT). 123
However, HIV replicates quickly, and mutations in the virus led to
pharmaceutical resistance. 124 Over the next several years, numerous
medications were developed which eventually led to the advent of combination
therapy, which allowed for durable suppression of HIV to undetectable levels

114. Rowland, supra note 98.
115. Drug Database: Emtricitabine / Tenofovir Disoproxil Fumarate, U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH
& HUMAN SERVS. (Feb. 10, 2020) https://clinicalinfo.hiv.gov/en/drugs/emtricitabine-tenofovirdisoproxil-fumarate/patient.
116. See supra note 115.
117. Id.
118. Id. See also U.S. Food & Drug Admin., Drug Approval Package, TRUVADA
(Emtricitabine and Tenofovir Disoproxil Fumarate) Tablets,
https://www.accessdata.fda.gov/drugsatfda_docs/nda/2004/021752s000_TruvadaTOC.cfm.
119. Id.
120. HIV Basics: Overview: Data & Trends: U.S. Statistics, DEPT. OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS.
(June 30, 2020), https://www.hiv.gov/hiv-basics/overview/data-and-trends/global-statistics.
121. Id.
122. The HIV/AIDS Epidemic in the United States: The Basics, KAISER FAM. FOUND. (Mar.
25, 2019), https://www.kff.org/hivaids/fact-sheet/the-hivaids-epidemic-in-the-united-states-thebasics/.
123. Antiretroviral Drug Discovery and Development, NAT’L INST. OF ALLERGY AND
INFECTIOUS DISEASES (Nov. 26, 2018), https://www.niaid.nih.gov/diseases-conditions/
antiretroviral-drug-development.
124. See generally Stanford University HIV Drug Resistance Database, Primer on HIV
Resistance (last updated Sept. 23, 1999), https://hivdb.stanford.edu/pages/documentPage/
primer.html
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by using two or three drugs simultaneously. 125 One of those drugs is Truvada,
which was approved by the FDA in 2004 for the treatment of HIV. 126 By and
through a series of experiments conducted by the CDC in the mid-2000s, it was
discovered that the components of Truvada were effective at preventing HIV
infection. 127 Based on those CDC studies, Gilead received approval from the
FDA in 2012 to sell Truvada as a PrEP regimen. 128 PrEP is remarkably effective
at preventing HIV transmission from sex and injection drug use: when taken
consistently, PrEP reduces the risk of HIV infection from sex by 99%, and by at
least 74% from injection drug use. 129 The potential impact on the spread of HIV
is enormous, and in fact has already been documented in other countries. For
example, Australia introduced a program of government-funded Truvada/PrEP
for high-risk Australian men in New South Wales, and experienced a twentyfive percent drop in new HIV diagnoses in just one year — reaching the lowest
number of new diagnoses in the area since recording began in 1985. 130
According to Gilead’s sales reports, sales of HIV and HBV products (including
Truvada’s newer version, Descovy) topped $14.2 billion in 2017 alone,
representing a significant portion of Gilead’s total product revenue for the year
. 131 The current monthly cost for a daily supply of Truvada approaches
$2,000. 132 This represents a 45% increase since Truvada was first approved for
PrEP in 2012. 133 Reports indicate that these same pills cost only $6 per month
outside of the United Sates. 134

125. Id.
126. FDA in Brief: FDA continues to encourage ongoing education about the benefits and
risks associated with PrEP, including additional steps to help reduce the risk of getting HIV, U.S.
FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (July 1, 2019), https://www.fda.gov/news-events/fda-brief/fda-brief-fdacontinues-encourage-ongoing-education-about-benefits-and-risks-associated-prep.
127. Complaint at 1, United States v. Gilead Scis., Inc., No. 1:19-cv-02103-UNA (D. Del. filed
Nov. 6, 2019).
128. Truvada FDA Approval History, DRUGS.COM, https://www.drugs.com/history/truvada.
html (last visited Mar. 7, 2021).
129. PrEP Effectiveness, CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/
hiv/basics/prep/prep-effectiveness.html (last updated Nov. 3, 2020).
130. Nina Avramova, PrEP can ‘significantly’ reduce HIV rates across populations, study
says, CNN (Oct. 17, 2018, 3:00 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2018/10/17/health/hiv-reduction-menprep-australia-intl-study/index.html.
131. Press Release, Gilead, Gilead Sciences Announces Fourth Quarter and Full Year 2017
Financial Results (Feb. 6, 2018), https://www.gilead.com/news-and-press/press-room/pressreleases/2018/2/gilead-sciences-announces-fourth-quarter-and-full-year-2017-financial-results.
132. Shefali Luthra & Anna Gorman, Rising Cost of PrEP to Prevent HIV Infection Pushes it
Out of Reach for Many, NPR (June 30, 2018, 6:00 AM), https://www.npr.org/sections/healthshots/2018/06/30/624045995/rising-cost-of-prep-a-pill-that-prevents-hiv-pushes-it-out-of-reachfor-many.
133. Id.
134. See GHJP Joins PrEP4All in Calling on CDC to Use Its Patents for PrEP, YLS TODAY
(Mar. 27, 2019), https://law.yale.edu/yls-today/news/ghjp-joins-prep4all-calling-cdc-use-itspatents-prep.
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H. Patent Conflicts Between the United States and Gilead
The United States has recently filed a civil suit against Gilead under 35 U.S.C.
§ 271 et seq. for infringement of four patents held by the CDC. 135 The
government contends that these patents collectively represent the CDC’s
groundbreaking work in discovering PrEP, i.e., that a combination of TDF and
FTC (i.e., Truvada) could be taken to prevent HIV infection. 136 It is undisputed
that Gilead developed Truvada, i.e., the combination of TDF and FTC into a
single pill. 137 The issue in the suit is over the fact that Gilead markets and sells
Truvada as a medication for PrEP, which (allegedly) violates the patents held by
the CDC. 138 The CDC claims that it has repeatedly tried to work with Gilead to
develop a licensing agreement whereby Gilead can market Truvada as PrEP for
a reasonable licensing fee. 139 Not only has Gilead refused to enter into such an
agreement, but they assert that the CDC’s patents are invalid. 140 While no court
or review board has yet made such a determination, industry commenters have
evaluated the patents and found no reason to believe that, if subjected to legal
challenge, the patents in question would be found invalid. 141 This Comment will
assume for the purposes of the overarching argument relating to government
usage of government-held patents that the patents would be held valid.
Gilead’s patent on pharmaceutical combinations of TDF and FTC (i.e.,
Truvada) runs through 2021, and as such there is no currently available generic
in the United States market. 142 Outside of the United States, however, one
company sells generic equivalents in several countries including “Canada,
Germany, France, Australia, and the United Kingdom[.]” 143 As further evidence
that a challenge to the CDC’s patents would be unsuccessful, a challenge was
made by generic drug manufacturer Mylan to the international counterpart to the
135. Complaint at 3, United States v. Gilead Scis., Inc., No. 1:19-cv-02103-UNA (D. Del. filed
Nov. 6, 2019) (The four patents are U.S. Patent Nos. 9,044,509, 9,579,333, 9,937,191, and
10,335,423. The patents are referred to collectively as “the Patents-in-Suit”).
136. Id. at 1.
137. Id. at 10.
138. Id. at 2–3.
139. Id. at 57–59.
140. Eric Sagonowsky, Gilead loses first PrEP patent challenge but vows to defend against
HHS lawsuit, FIERCEPHARMA (Feb. 7, 2020, 8:35 AM), https://www.fiercepharma.com/pharma/
gilead-loses-first-prep-patent-challenge-but-vows-to-defend-against-hhs-lawsuit.
141. Christopher Morten, Statement on CDC’s Patents for PrEP, YALE GLOB. HEALTH JUST.
P’SHIP 2 (Mar. 12, 2019), https://law.yale.edu/sites/default/files/area/center/ghjp/documents/ghjp
mortenstatement.pdf.
142. Gilead recently announced it had struck a deal with generic drug maker Teva to bring a
generic Truvada to market one year ahead of schedule, at some time in 2020. As of the time of this
writing no generic is yet available in the United States market. See Richard Morgan, HIV
prevention drugs illustrate just how bad pharmaceutical patents are for our health, NBC NEWS
(Dec. 1, 2020), https://www.nbcnews.com/think/opinion/hiv-prevention-drugs-illustrate-just-howbad-pharmaceutical-patents-are-ncna1249428.
143. Complaint at 56, United States v. Gilead Scis., Inc., No. 1:19-cv-02103-UNA (D. Del.
filed Nov. 6, 2019).
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CDC’s patents-in-suit before the European Patent Office. 144 The CDC’s
European patent survived the challenge and is still in force today. 145 As a result,
Mylan entered into a settlement agreement with the CDC and agreed to pay the
CDC royalties. 146 Another pharmaceutical manufacturer, TAD Pharma GmbH,
has taken a similar license “to sell a generic equivalent to Truvada for PrEP in
Germany.” 147 The details of these settlement licensing agreements are not
known, but the payment amounts collected from Mylan have been described as
“small.” 148 Still, advocacy groups point out that the CDC extracting licensing
fees from foreign manufacturers makes a low-cost generic drug more expensive
in countries abroad. 149 This is particularly unpalatable given that the only
manufacturer allowed to sell to American consumers is, as of now, not paying a
licensing fee and charging much higher prices than the foreign manufacturers
who do pay the fees. 150
Advocacy groups have been calling for the CDC to leverage its patents for
PrEP for the benefit of the American people. 151 Specifically, the PrEP4All
Collaboration (“PrEP4All”) has joined with the Yale Global Health Justice
Partnership (GHJP) with a call for the CDC to force Gilead to pay a royalty and
to use the proceeds to promote public access to PrEP. 152 PrEP4All and GHJP
have outlined several elements that should be included in any agreement
between Gilead and the CDC:
• Payment by Gilead of royalty revenues not just for future use of the
CDC’s patents for PrEP but also for past infringement.
• A licensing structure under which Gilead continues to pay royalties,
even in the event that Gilead obtains FDA approval for PrEP with a
newer branded product, Descovy (emtricitabine and tenofovir
alafenamide) tablets.
• A bar prohibiting Gilead from increasing the price of Truvada or
Descovy as a result of the licensing agreement.
• Transparent payment of royalties by Gilead and transparent
investment of the royalty revenue by CDC.

144. Morten, supra note 141, at 7.
145. Id.
146 Ed Silverman, AIDS activists skewer CDC for conflicting stance on collecting HIV drug
royalties, (Apr. 10, 2019), http://web.archive.org/web/20190411172712/https://www.statnews.
com/pharmalot/2019/04/10/aids-cdc-hiv-patents-royalties/.
147. Complaint at 57, United States v. Gilead Scis., Inc., No. 1:19-cv-02103-UNA (D. Del.
filed Nov. 6, 2019).
148. Ed Silverman, supra note 146.
149. Id.
150. Id.; see also Luthra, supra note 132.
151. GHJP Joins PrEP4All in Calling on CDC to Use Its Patents for PrEP, supra note 134.
152. Id.
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Use of CDC’s royalty revenue to fund “wrap-around” services and
programs, such as laboratory tests and clinical care, that enable
vulnerable Americans to access PrEP.
• Provision by the CDC of low-cost PrEP, whether low-cost branded
Truvada or a generic alternative, to public health programs and
clinics serving vulnerable communities. 153
A March 2019 Washington Post article highlighted some of the reasons why
the government has been slow to aggressively act against Gilead for
infringement. 154 After years of collaboration, an interdependence has developed
between government research and private drug companies. 155 The government
historically has sought to encourage commercialization of its research, not stifle
the dissemination of new medical breakthroughs by bringing patent
infringement lawsuits. 156 While the companies may be making a profit, at the
end of the day they are producing lifesaving drugs on which millions of
Americans rely. Importantly, however, it should be noted that the government
routinely licenses these discoveries. 157
President Trump announced in his 2019 State of the Union address a goal of
eradicating HIV/AIDS by 2030. 158 Dr. Anthony Fauci of the National Institute
of Allergy and Infectious Diseases later elaborated that the administration would
rely on two strategies to accomplish this goal: “antiretroviral medications and
the increased use of preventative drugs”, e.g., Truvada for PrEP. 159 President
Trump subsequently called for $291 million dollars in his proposed 2020 budget
to fund the initiative, $140 million of which would go, in part, to providing
treatment and medications used for PrEP. 160 This represents an eighteen percent
increase in the CDC’s HIV prevention funding above the previous fiscal year. 161
It is important to note that in addition to concerns over drug prices, education
•

153 GHJP Joins PrEP4All in Calling on CDC to Use Its Patents for PrEP, YLS TODAY (Mar.
27, 2019), https://law.yale.edu/yls-today/news/ghjp-joins-prep4all-calling-cdc-use-its-patentsprep.
154. Rowland, supra note 98.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. In State of Union, Trump Announces Plan to Target HIV Hot Spots in Ambitious Goal to
Reduce New Infections, KHN MORNING BRIEFING (Feb. 6, 2019), https://khn.org/morningbreakout/in-state-of-union-trump-announces-plan-to-target-hiv-hot-spots-in-ambitious-goal-toreduce-new-infections/.
159. Id.
160. Lena H. Sun, Trump budget calls for $291 million to fund HIV initiative, WASH. POST
(Mar. 11, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/health/2019/03/11/trump-budget-calls-millionfund-hiv-initiative/.
161. Id.; CDC HIV Prevention Funding, FY 1981 – FY 2020 Budget Request (BR), KAISER
FAM. FOUND. (Mar. 11, 2019), https://www.kff.org/hivaids/slide/cdc-hiv-prevention-funding-fy1981-fy-2020-budget-request-br/.
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programs for both patients and healthcare providers are equally critical in the
overall effort to end the HIV/AIDS epidemic. For example, the American South
had 20,000 new HIV diagnoses in 2017 — more than the remaining regions of
the United States combined. 162 A combination of “stigma, poverty, inadequate
access to health care and lingering racial bias” is to blame for this surprising
statistic. 163 Still, the issue of education and awareness is directly linked to drug
prices. For example, Virginia Medicaid pays $54.04 per pill (over $1600 per
month) of Truvada. 164 That takes away from the funding available to provide
the educational programming necessary for outreach. Even President Trump’s
$291 million dollars in allocated funding comes as part of an overall package
that reduces total funding to Medicaid. 165
For its part, Gilead makes several contentions in rebuttal, namely that the
government’s PrEP patents are either invalid or at least do not reflect Gilead’s
own contributions to the research, and that Gilead has been active in finding
solutions to high prices and other barriers to widespread PrEP usage in high-risk
populations. 166 Gilead points out that they offer discount coupons for uninsured
patients to reduce their monthly costs, and that it has spent almost $140 million
dollars since 2012 on grants and programs to promote education and raise
awareness. 167
II. A WAY FORWARD: QUESTIONS AND IMPLICATIONS
The government’s recent action to sue Gilead for infringement raises several
questions. Assuming the patent is valid, what kind of damages can the
government expect to recover? Will it be enough to make a meaningful impact
in the fight against the HIV/AIDS epidemic, either by funding the purchase of
Truvada for usage as PrEP or by establishing enough education and outreach
programs to make a meaningful difference? If so, what kind of impact could be
expected on the relationship between the CDC and drug manufacturers which
have previously worked together in partnership? In other words, if the
government were to win the suit, would it result in pharmaceutical companies
being less willing to market potentially life-saving drugs to new consumers,
ultimately slowing progress in health research and discovery? And finally, does
this challenge put the entire government-owned patent paradigm under a
spotlight that might expose the entire system to accusations of
unconstitutionality?
162. Lenny Bernstein, This HIV pill saves lives. So why is it so hard to get in the Deep South?,
WASH. POST (Mar. 11, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/health-science/this-hivpill-saves-lives-so-why-is-it-so-hard-to-get-in-the-deep-south/2019/03/11/a221a784-354a-11e9854a-7a14d7fec96a_story.html.
163. Id.
164. Rowland, supra note 98.
165. Bernstein, supra note 162.
166. Rowland, supra note 98.
167. Id.
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The 1947 Department of Justice report warned against the concern of double
billing taxpayers — once for the research, and again to buy the fruits of that
research. 168 This is a crucial component of the argument that advocacy groups
make to encourage the government to engage in enforcement actions against
Gilead — that the taxpayer has paid for the research that discovered PrEP and
pharmaceutical companies (like Gilead) unjustly reap the benefit of that taxpayer
investment. 169 Title 35 of the United States Code specifically states that it is the
“objective of Congress to use the patent system to promote the utilization of
inventions arising from federally supported research or development[.]” 170
However, this comes with the crucial caveat that the patent system also “meet
the needs of the Government and protect the public against . . . the unreasonable
use of inventions[.]” 171
If the government prevails in its suit and is able to extract damages and fees
from Gilead, that money could be used for lifesaving programs and medications.
This also means that in some ways the patent system remains virtually
unscathed: a party who infringes upon a patent is liable for damages. There is
certainly room for the argument that the government should be treated as a
private patent holder, and that the “government-owned” aspect doesn’t impact
whether or not a valid patent was infringed. However, the reality is that the
government as a patent owner is unique. Were the government to act on its
patents to exclude others, they could be defeating the purpose sought by our
country’s Framers of promoting progress and the advancement of society. 172
In truth, the relationship between government health research and private
pharmaceutical companies is a well-established relationship. It has only been
recently, with enormous spikes in drug prices, that public outrage has led to a
close examination of this system. This might suggest that if the government
were to disturb the system by suddenly taking patents on offense, the
relationship could become seriously unbalanced. A disruption could result in
negative health outcomes for millions of Americans across a broad range of
health issues, from high blood pressure to cancer. However, if the current
system is no longer working, a realignment of the relationship may be necessary
for long-term benefits and for the advancement of health research into the future.
Finally, by taking a protective stance over its patent collection, the
government is in effect removing publicly funded inventions from the reach of
the public. However, as shown by the fact that the CDC routinely licenses its
patents for nominal fees, 173 it seems unlikely that any seismic shift in the
landscape would result. The key is in crafting a licensing agreement that
encourages companies to be reasonable in their pricing schemes while also
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.

Lerner, supra note 47, at 1853; see infra Sec. I.D.
Our Story, PREP4ALL, https://www.prep4all.org/our-story (last visited March 17, 2021).
35 U.S.C. § 200 (emphasis added).
Id.
See infra Sec. I.F.
See infra Sec. I.
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ensuring that the public is not unfairly charged for inventions and discoveries
for which they have already paid. It is a novel idea for the government to wield
its patent estate for public policy goals, but one that has enormous potential. If
the government prevails in its suit against Gilead, it is almost guaranteed that we
would see more of these actions in the future. Such power is also rife with
potential for abuse, and advocates should be mindful that if the government
succeeds in this case it will theoretically have the power to selectively withhold
licenses from certain individuals in the name of policy goals. As the guiding
ideology of our political system is subject to change every two to four years, the
possibility of corruption and uncertainty could have a net negative effect on
progress in various fields of study.
III. CONCLUSION
The government is one of the largest owners of United States patents, yet
surprisingly does not often sue private parties for infringement. One reason for
this is that the legality of the patent estate remains somewhat unsettled. Issues
stemming from the language of the Constitution itself underlie concerns ranging
from contract theory to untenable public policy positions. More obviously,
however, there simply hasn’t been occasion for any court to consider the issue.
This may change, however, if the government prevails in its first-of-its-kind suit
against Gilead. Ultimately, it remains to be seen how the courts will treat a
challenge brought by the government for infringement, but surely these issues
and more will inform the court’s thinking and possibly even its decision.
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